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Abstract
This paper examines whether the U.S. Federal Reserve has ad-
justed high-powered money supply in response to macroeconomic
indicators. Applying ex-post and real-time data for the postwar
period, we provide evidence that nonborrowed reserves responded
to expected in￿ ation and the output-gap. While the output-gap
feedback has always been negative, the response of money sup-
ply to changes in in￿ ation varies considerably across time. The
in￿ ation feedback is negative in the post-1979 period and posi-
tive, albeit smaller than one, in the pre-1979 period. Applying a
standard macroeconomic model, these properties are shown to be
consistent with a welfare maximizing policy, and to ensure equi-
librium determinacy. Viewed through the money supply lens, the
Fed has thus never allowed for endogenous ￿ uctuations, which
contrasts conclusions drawn from federal funds rate analyses.
JEL classi￿cation: E51, E52, E32.
Keywords: Nonborrowed reserves, monetary policy reaction func-
tions, real-time data, determinacy
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This paper re-examines postwar U.S. Federal Reserve policy by looking at the supply of
high-powered money at business cycle frequency. Our main objective is to disclose whether
the well-established shift in the conduct of monetary policy between the pre-1979 (pre-
Volcker) and the post-1979 (Vocker-Greenspan) period is mirrored in systematic adjust-
ments of high-powered money. To this end, we examine the feedback from macroeconomic
indicators to money supply and estimate forward-looking reaction functions for nonbor-
rowed reserves. Given that the latter serves as the monetary instrument that implements
particular interest rate targets (see Meulendyke, 1998), we expect that systematic changes
of nonborrowed reserves and the federal funds rate are closely related.
In this context, our approach corresponds to the one of Clarida et al. (2000) and
Orphanides (2001) who estimate forward-looking feedback rules for the federal funds rate.
Our empirical analysis reveals substantial di⁄erences in the way the Federal Reserve has
adjusted money supply in response to changes in macroeconomic indicators between the
pre-1979 and the post-1979 period. While this phenomenon has been observed in the
empirical literature on forward-looking interest rate rules, our theoretical analysis indicates
that the alleged macroeconomic instability in the pre-1979 period has not been associated
with multiple equilibria, as for example suggested by Clarida et al. (2000). In fact, by
looking through the money supply lens the pre-Volcker policy was less anti-in￿ ationary,
but nevertheless ensured equilibrium determinacy.
The starting point of our analysis is that the supply of nonborrowed reserves rather
than the federal funds rate is directly controlled by the Federal Reserve. Thus, policy-
induced changes in intermediate or macroeconomic targets should be associated with
changes in the supply of high-powered money. This view accords with Eichenbaum (1992)
or Strongin (1995) who analyzed the e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks measured by unan-
ticipated changes in nonborrowed reserves using vector autoregressions (VARs). Their
identi￿cation of money supply shocks is based on the isolation of exogenous policy actions
from systematic money supply adjustments.4 However, the implied reaction function for
the supply of nonborrowed reserves has drawn much less attention than reaction functions
for the federal funds rate.
Focussing on the federal funds rate, several studies have shown that its movements
can be summarized by forward-looking reaction functions (see Woodford, 2003, for an
overview). These reaction functions, which are often termed Taylor-rules, show that the
federal funds rate has been adjusted in response to changes in expected in￿ ation, the
output-gap, and its own lag. Furthermore, shifts in the reactiveness of the federal funds
rate have been taken as an indicator for shifts in the conduct of monetary policy. In
4Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Christiano et al. (1999) also apply VARs to examine responses to
monetary policy shocks which are identi￿ed with innovations to nonborrowed reserves.
2their seminal paper, Clarida et al. (2000) have found that the feedback from expected
in￿ ation to the federal funds rate has been less pronounced in the pre-1979 period than
in the period after 1979, the year Paul Volcker￿ s mandate as Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System started.
By estimating a forward-looking reaction function for the growth rate of nonborrowed
reserves for U.S. postwar data we provide evidence that money supply has also responded
to changes in the expected in￿ ation rate and the output-gap. In particular, we ￿nd that
the growth rate of nonborrowed reserves has always responded negatively to a rise in the
output-gap. In contrast, money supply responses to changes in expected in￿ ation exhibit
a qualitative di⁄erence between the pre-1979 and the post-1979 period. The in￿ ation
feedback is negative for the Volcker-Greenspan era, while it is positive for the pre-Volcker
era. These results indicate that Federal Reserve policy in the pre-Volcker period has less
aimed to stabilize in￿ ation than in the Volcker-Greenspan period. The qualitative shift in
the money supply behavior is further found to be robust for various speci￿cations of the
forward-looking component (in￿ ation) and for the output-gap.
To further assess the robustness of our results, we account for an important criticism
raised by several authors, namely, that monetary policy assessments based on ex post data
might lead to biased results (e.g. Orphanides, 2001, 2002, 2004; Boivin, 2006). Speci￿cally,
estimations of forward-looking reaction functions for the federal funds rate with real-time
data by Orphanides (2004) indicate that interest rate adjustments to in￿ ation forecasts
hardly di⁄ered between the pre-1979 period and the post-1979 period. To account for this
argument, we estimate money supply reaction functions using the so-called Greenbook
forecasts (which the sta⁄ of the Federal Reserve prepared for the Federal Reserve Open
Market Committee meetings). Notably, our estimates based on real-time data do not
qualitatively di⁄er from our ex post data-based estimates.
Hence, viewing Federal Reserve policy through a money supply lens points to a clear
regime shift in the conduct of monetary policy, regardless whether the assessment is based
on ex post data or real-time data. This ￿nding is of particular interest given that the
empirical literature on forward-looking interest rate reaction functions is less clear on the
shift of U.S. monetary policy in the 1980s. The real-time evidence by Orphanides (2004),
for example, contrasts Clarida et al.￿ s (2000) results based on ex post data by pointing to
a forward-looking approach to policy consistent with strong reactions to in￿ ation forecasts
both before and after Volcker￿ s appointment as Chairman.
In the theoretical part of the paper we apply a consensus macroeconomic model where
monetary policy is summarized by a state contingent money supply, i.e. a forward-looking
money growth reaction function. This model, which is otherwise identical to the standard
New Keynesian model (see Clarida et al., 1999, 2000), is applied to derive characteristics
for money supply reaction functions consistent with a welfare maximizing policy and with
equilibrium determinacy. As the central principle it is shown that the money growth
3rate should not rise with (expected) in￿ ation by more than one for one in order to avoid
indeterminacy. Thus, money supply should satisfy a restriction on the in￿ ation feedback
which corresponds to the well-known "Taylor-principle" (see Woodford, 2001).5 Applying
this condition to assess the stability implications of the estimated money supply reaction
functions, we ￿nd that Federal Reserve policy always ensured uniqueness of a rational
expectations equilibrium. Notably, this result holds for both policy regimes regardless
whether the point estimates for the feedback coe¢ cients are based on real-time or revised
data.
Concisely, we cannot con￿rm Clarida et al.￿ s (2000) hypothesis that Federal Reserve
policy in the pre-1979 period failed to pin down an unique rational expectations equilib-
rium. Put di⁄erently, our theoretical analysis indicates that Federal Reserve policy has
never allowed for expectations driven in￿ ation ￿ uctuations. Nonetheless, our results con-
￿rm that there has been a shift in the Fed￿ s stance towards the stabilization of in￿ ation
relatively to the output-gap.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 provides the empirical
analysis. Section 3 brie￿ y describes the macroeconomic model and characterizes e¢ cient
money supply. Further, it presents closed form determinacy conditions for money supply
reactions functions. Section 4 concludes.
2 Postwar Federal Reserve money supply
It has become common practice in theoretical and empirical analysis to characterize mon-
etary policy by feedback rules for a short-run interest rate, which serves as the central
bank￿ s operating target. Empirical studies by Taylor (1999), Clarida et al. (2000) or
Orphanides (2001) have shown that the systematic component of postwar U.S. mone-
tary policy can be described by state contingent adjustments of the federal funds rate.
However, in order to control the interest rate, the Federal Reserve adjusts quantities of
high-powered money in open market operations. Put di⁄erently, sales and purchases of
nonborrowed reserves in open market operations actually serve as monetary instruments,
which are used to implement particular interest rate targets (see Meulendyke, 1998).6
In this Section, we examine whether U.S. monetary policy can alternatively be charac-
terized by systematic adjustments of the monetary instrument, i.e., nonborrowed reserves.
5When an interest rate policy is active, i.e., satis￿es the Taylor-principle, the real interest rate increases
with in￿ ation and equilibrium determinacy is ensured. Correspondingly, the growth rate of real balances
should decrease with in￿ ation in order to avoid indeterminacy (see Schabert, 2006).
6By purchasing or selling securities through open market operations the Federal Reserve adjusts the
supply of nonborrowed reserves. In addition, the Federal Reserve can supply reserves to the banking
system by lending through the Federal Reserve discount window. Reserves obtained through this channel
are known as borrowed reserves. In general, banks are expected to make use of the discount window
borrowing only after drawing on all other available sources of funds. With the development of ￿nancial
markets it has become more feasible and e¢ cient to provide reserves primarily through open market
operations. Accordingly, discount window lending has accounted for a relatively small part of total reserves.
4Corresponding to studies on interest rate feedback rules, we thereby aim to unveil how the
monetary policy stance systematically changes with (expected) changes in core macroeco-
nomic variables, i.e., in￿ ation and the output-gap. Further, we want to examine if there
exists a shift in the Federal Reserve￿ s money supply that relates to the well-established
shift in the federal funds rate behavior, which has been interpreted as an indication that
Federal Reserve policy in pre-1979 period has been less stabilizing than in the post-1979
period.
2.1 Evidence from vector autoregressions
The behavior of nonborrowed reserves and the federal funds rate has been examined in
a number of studies. Studies by Hamilton (1997), Thornton (2001), or Carpenter and
Demiralp (2006) build on comprehensive speci￿cations of the market for federal reserves,
focussing on the behavior of the federal funds rate and money supply on the basis of high
frequency data (daily and monthly frequency). One central question in this literature
relates to the existence of a liquidity e⁄ect, i.e., a negative relation between the supply of
reserves and the change in the federal funds rate. While the existence of such a relationship
seems to be relevant for the control of the federal funds rate, there is no clear evidence in
favor of a liquidity e⁄ect (see Leeper and Gordon, 1992, or Thornton, 2001).
Unlike these studies, our analysis of monetary policy draws on data at business cycle
frequencies. It is widely known that the behavior of reserves at higher frequency can be
distorted by a mismatch between the Federal Reserve￿ s forecast of the supply of reserves
and the actual supply of reserves perceived in the banking system. Even though the
Federal Reserve attempts to sterilize unanticipated money market distortions on a daily
basis, it cannot fully neutralize the arising mismatch. At lower frequencies, however,
changes in the supply of nonborrowed reserves should primarily re￿ ect changes in the
monetary policy stance. Hence, distortions arising through non-monetary policy e⁄ects at
higher frequencies are largely neutralized at lower frequency.
Another strand of the literature, which is more related to the purpose of this pa-
per, has focussed on the monetary transmission mechanism at lower frequency, where
monetary policy shocks are identi￿ed with changes in nonborrowed reserves. Structural
vector autoregressions (SVARs) in Eichenbaum (1992), Strongin (1995), and Christiano
et al. (1999) show that unanticipated changes in the supply of nonborrowed reserves yield
changes in real activity and aggregate prices. In order to identify monetary policy shocks,
exogenous policy changes have to be isolated from endogenous reactions of the monetary
policy stance. Hence, the SVARs contain a reaction function for nonborrowed reserves,
which describes how the Federal Reserve has adjusted money supply contingent on changes
in macroeconomic variables of interest.
To provide some VAR-based evidence on shifts in the money supply behavior, we esti-
mate a reduced-form VAR using quarterly data for the U.S. and compute impulse response
5functions for nonborrowed reserves. The objective of this exercise is to examine how non-
borrowed reserves vary systematically to changes in main macroeconomic indicators across
di⁄erent sample periods. Our estimated VAR closely relates to the benchmark speci￿ca-
tion of Christiano et al. (1999) and includes the log of real GDP (Y ), the log of the
implicit GDP de￿ ator (P), the change in an index of commodity prices (CP), the federal
funds rate (FF), the log of total reserves (TR) and the log of nonborrowed reserves plus
extended credit (NBR), respectively. The overall sample period covers the time horizon
1960 Q1 to 1999 Q4.
We additionally estimate the VAR for two sub-samples, namely, for the periods before
and after 1979, the year Paul Volcker started the mandate as Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The ￿rst subsample covers the period 1960 Q1 to
1979 Q2 (pre-Volcker period), and the second subsample spans the period 1982 Q4 to 1999
Q4 (Volcker-Greenspan period).7 According to a widespread view Federal Reserve policy
has been less well managed in the pre-Volcker period than in the Volcker-Greenspan period.
According to this view, Federal Reserve policy during the pre-Volcker period has been less
anti-in￿ ationary than after Paul Volcker￿ s appointment as Fed Chairman (see Friedman
and Kuttner, 1996, or Taylor, 1999). Several empirical studies have highlighted this shift
in the conduct of U.S. monetary policy. Speci￿cally, Clarida et al. (2000), who estimated
a forward-looking reaction function for the federal funds rate, established a signi￿cant
di⁄erence in the way the federal funds rate has responded to changes in macroeconomic
indicators.
For all VAR estimations, standard lag selection criteria recommended a lag length of 4
quarters and we apply structural identi￿cations schemes to identify exogenous monetary
policy shocks. A speci￿c identi￿cation scheme, which, for example, is used by Christiano
et al. (1999), is based on a Cholesky decomposition combined with a Wold ordering of
the variables where nonborrowed reserves can react to contemporaneous changes in the
remaining variables. Here, we adopt their identi￿cation scheme and compute impulse
responses to innovations in macroeconomic variables, to demonstrate how the responses
of nonborrowed reserves changed over time.
7Although Volcker was appointed Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
in 1979, we refrain from including the ￿rst three years of his mandate in the sample period because this
might lead to biased estimates for the Volcker-Greenspan period (see Clarida et al. 2000). Indeed, for a
brief period at the start of the Volcker era, the Fed seemed to pursue a policy of non-borrowed reserves
targeting (see Goodfriend, 1991).
6Figure 1: Responses of Nonborrowed Reserves
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Figure 1 presents impulse responses of nonborrowed reserves to innovations in key macro-
economic variables, such as (Y , CP, and NBR). Overall, the impulse response functions
suggest that the supply of nonborrowed reserves is reduced in response to positive inno-
vations in real activity and commodity prices. Yet, the ￿rst column shows that only in
the Volcker-Greenspan period nonborrowed reserves responded to changes in real activity
in a signi￿cant way.8 This di⁄erence is less pronounced for the responses to commodity
8The dotted lines present a two standard error band, computed with the Monte Carlo method, spanning
a 95% con￿dence interval.
7price innovations (second column), though the point estimates suggest a more persistent
response in the Volcker-Greenspan period. Finally, nonborrowed reserves always exhibit
a signi￿cant and positive response to own innovations, while the persistence is most pro-
nounced in the Volcker-Greenspan period.
2.2 Money supply reaction functions
The VAR estimates already disclose di⁄erences in Federal Reserve money supply adjust-
ments between the pre- and the post-1979 periods. In order to provide a more transparent
view on the systematic part of money supply we apply a single equation approach, which
is now widely used to measure systematic central bank adjustments of a short-run interest
rate. Speci￿cally, we estimate a reaction function for the growth rate of nonborrowed
reserves, which closely relates to the speci￿cation of the reaction function for the federal
funds rate in Clarida et al. (2000). Thus, we assume that the growth rate of nonborrowed
reserves responds to expected in￿ ation and the output-gap in the following way:
￿t = ￿￿t￿1 + ￿￿Et f￿t+ng + ￿yxt + "t; (1)
where ￿t denotes the annualized growth rate of nonborrowed reserves, xt the output-gap
measure, and Et f￿t+ng is the expected in￿ ation rate in t+n. The error term "t is assumed
to be independently and identically distributed (iid) Gaussian.
The speci￿cation (1) evidently di⁄ers from the previous VAR-based speci￿cation. First,
the single-equation approach is based on a parsimonious speci￿cation in growth rates,
which allows for a more comprehensible interpretation of the estimated coe¢ cients, but
nonetheless is consistent with a log-level VAR speci￿cation. Second, unlike in the VAR
approach, where the impact of expected future in￿ ation is indirectly considered by the
commodity price index, expected in￿ ation is now modelled explicitly. Third, in line with
interest rate feedback rules output-gap instead of output is considered as an additional
explanatory variable. Finally, we chose the narrowest monetary aggregate and carry out
all estimations using nonborrowed reserves as opposed to nonborrowed reserves plus credit,
which has been used in the previous section.
We ￿rst estimate (1) over a sample period which spans forty years of Federal Reserve
policy. All data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and are of quar-
terly frequency, spanning the horizon 1960:1-1999:4. Our benchmark in￿ ation measure is
based on the GDP de￿ ator and is de￿ned as the annualized percentage change in the price
level between two subsequent quarters. Alternatively, we also consider consumer price in-
￿ ation. output-gap is de￿ned as the percent deviation between actual GDP and potential
GDP as constructed by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (CBO). We additionally allow for
two alternative output-gap measures: (a) deviation of (log) GDP from a ￿tted quadratic
function of time; and (b) the deviation of the unemployment rate from a similar time
trend. For the future in￿ ation rate we consider a horizon of one quarter in our benchmark
8estimations (n = 1). We further allow for longer in￿ ation horizons and report estimates
based on a forward-looking horizon of four quarters (n = 4).
A widely used technique for estimating an equation of above nature is Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM). The starting point of any GMM estimation is a theoretical
relation that the parameters should satisfy, which is described by orthogonality conditions
between some function of the parameters f (￿) and a set of instrumental variables zt:
Et (f (￿)zt) = 0; (2)
where ￿ contains the parameters to be estimated. Let f (￿) = ￿t ￿￿￿t￿1 ￿￿￿Et f￿t+ng￿
￿yxt and assuming rational expectations we can write
Et
￿￿









.9 For all esti-
mations the vector of instruments includes four lags of the growth rate of nonborrowed
reserves, output-gap, and in￿ ation. Since not all current information may be available to
the public at the time they form expectations, contemporary variables are not used as
instruments.
The estimation results for the full sample are summarized in Table 1. All speci￿cations
are associated with a signi￿cant and pronounced autocorrelation coe¢ cient ￿. Turning to
the output-gap, a widening of the output-gap leads to a negative response in the supply
of nonborrowed reserves. The estimated coe¢ cient ￿y is statistically signi￿cant and lies
in a range between ￿0:25 for the in￿ ation rate based on the GDP de￿ ator and ￿0:29 for
CPI in￿ ation. In contrast, there is no statistically signi￿cant relationship between the
growth rate of nonborrowed reserves and expected in￿ ation for both in￿ ation measures
over the full sample period, including the real-time data speci￿cation "Greenbook" (which
we discuss below). While the estimated coe¢ cient ￿￿ on expected in￿ ation is positive,
albeit close to zero, it is not found to be statistically signi￿cant. A common view on
stabilizing monetary policy, would certainly suggest a negative relationship between the
supply of nonborrowed reserves and expected in￿ ation: Higher expected in￿ ation should
induce an anti-in￿ ationary monetary policy to reduce the supply of nonborrowed reserves
(see section 3). The above reported estimation results, however, seem to proof us wrong.
An explanation for this ￿nding might relate to the considered sample period, which does
not distinguish between distinct periods of Federal Reserve policy. To this end we carry
out sub-sample estimations for the money supply reaction function.
9The parameter estimates are obtained using a criterion function, that is of the following nature:
J (￿) = (f (￿)z)
0 W (f (￿)z), where W is a weighting matrix.
9Table 1. Estimation Results for the Sample Period: 1960 - 1999
GDP Deflator CPI Greenbook





































R2 0:70 0:70 0:70 0:70 0:44 0:60
J 0:62 0:61 0:58 0:57 0:69 0:69
Notes: Figures in parentheses below coe¢ cient estimates denote stan-
dard errors. Coe¢ cients which are signi￿cant at the 5 percent level are
marked with "*". R2 denotes the coe¢ cient of determination; J is a
test statistic for the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions
are satis￿ed. For the latter we only report p-values.
The ￿rst period we examine, covers the time horizon 1960:01 to 1979:2 and is referred to
as the pre-Volcker era. We further explore monetary policy in the Volcker-Greenspan era,
which covers the time horizon 1982:4 to 1999:4. Table 2 summarizes the results for the
pre-Volcker period.
Table 2. Estimation Results: Pre-Volcker Period
GDP Deflator CPI

























R2 0:52 0:52 0:54 0:53
J 0:77 0:77 0:65 0:61
Notes: See notes to Table 1.
The feedback from changes in the output-gap is again negative and signi￿cant. Notably,
the estimated coe¢ cient b ￿￿ on forward-looking in￿ ation is signi￿cantly positive, suggesting
10that monetary policy during the pre-Volcker period was accommodating - higher expected
in￿ ation led to an increase in the money supply. Our ￿ndings are not sensitive to the
chosen in￿ ation measure with b ￿￿ varying between 0:11 and 0:24. The feedback from
expected future in￿ ation on the growth rate of the monetary aggregate appears to be less
pronounced for longer horizons (n = 4).
Table 3 provides results obtained from estimating (1) using data for the Volcker-
Greenspan period. The most striking result discovered for this period concerns the in-
￿ ation elasticity, which is now found to be signi￿cantly negative at all in￿ ation measures
and in￿ ation target horizons. Thus, monetary policy as measured by a forward-looking
money supply reaction function appeared to be more reactive than in the previous period.
This conclusion principally corresponds to earlier results on the federal funds rate behavior
where the Volcker-Greenspan era is found to exhibit more aggressive (anti-in￿ ationary)
interest rate adjustments (see Boivin 2006, Boivin and Giannoni, 2006, and Clarida et
al., 2000). The reported estimates for ￿￿ range between ￿0:35 and ￿0:62. Unlike in
the pre-Volcker period, the supply of nonborrowed reserves now reacts somewhat stronger
to expected in￿ ation under a one year forward looking in￿ ation horizon, suggesting that
the Federal Reserve has shifted its focus towards longer target horizons. Estimates of
￿y indicate that the responses of nonborrowed reserves to the cyclical variable in both
sub-periods are of comparable size. In fact, the average value for b ￿y equals ￿0:51 (￿0:34)
for the GDP de￿ ator (CPI) in the pre-Volcker period, which compares to a value of ￿0:60
(￿0:27) for the Volcker-Greenspan period.
Table 3. Estimation Results: Volcker-Greenspan Period
GDP Deflator CPI

























R2 0:73 0:73 0:69 0:71
J 0:92 0:95 0:80 0:76
Notes: See notes to Table 1.
In general, the goodness-of-￿t statistics are satisfactory for both sub-samples, with the
coe¢ cient of determination ranging from 0:52 for the pre-Volcker period to 0:73 for the
11Volcker-Greenspan era. Hansen￿ s J-test, which tests the validity of overidentifying re-
strictions, indicates that overall the null hypothesis that overidentifying restrictions are
satis￿ed could not be rejected.
We additionally conducted sub-sample estimations of (1) based on two alternative
output-gap measures as described above. Our ￿ndings, which are summarized in Table
A1 and A2 (see appendix), illustrate the robustness of our benchmark results as reported
in Table 1 and 2. In fact, both the signs and magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients
remain broadly unchanged. In line with our baseline estimates, there remains the striking
subsample di⁄erence in the coe¢ cient measuring the sensitivity of nonborrowed reserves to
expected in￿ ation: In the pre-Volcker period the coe¢ cient b ￿￿ only takes positive values,
while it is always negative in the Volcker-Greenspan period.10
2.3 Real-Time Estimates
Our previously reported results indicate the robustness of the sub-sample ￿ndings across
di⁄erent speci￿cations including alternative in￿ ation and output-gap measures and dif-
ferent target horizons. To further assess the robustness of our results we examine the
conduct of monetary policy under real-time data. Boivin (2006) and Orphanides (2001,
2002) have recently argued that the assessment of monetary policy based on ex post data
produces a blurry picture, as central bankers are constrained by real-time information.
Orphanides (2002, 2004), applying real-time data to a forward-looking interest rate reac-
tion function, o⁄ers intriguing evidence that monetary policy during the pre-Volcker era
was not accommodative at all but responded strongly to in￿ ation forecasts. This ￿nding
evidently contrast those reported by Clarida et al. (2000).
A set of in￿ ation forecasts suitable for analyzing the nature of real-time U.S. monetary
policy is drawn from the so-called Greenbook. Greenbook forecasts are prepared by the
sta⁄ of the Board of Governors for the meetings of the FOMC and have been used in a
number of studies.11 Using the Greenbook forecasts in this context yield some important
bene￿ts. First, these forecasts are generated using information that was actually available
at the time monetary policy decisions were made, providing a more precise view on mone-
tary policy decisions. Second, since Greenbook forecasts are computed using a large set of
information from a wide range of sources, the Fed forecasts might have an informational
advantage over private sector forecasts. In fact, Romer and Romer (2000) have docu-
mented that Greenbook forecasts are exceptionally accurate compared to private-sector
10We also performed the estimations using non-borrowed reserves plus credit as the monetary aggregate.
The results are qualitatively similar to our benchmark results. They are available from the authors upon
request.
11See for example, Orphanides (2001, 2002, 2004), or Romer and Romer (2003). Information on the
construction of these forecasts can be found in Reifschneider et al. (1997) and Orphanides (2004) who
emphasize that forecasts are conditioned on an assumed path for the federal funds rate. Moreover, unlike
other forecasts, which are often derived on the basis of econometric forecasting models, Greenbook forecasts
comprise a large "judgmental" component.
12forecasts.12 Finally, since Greenbook forecasts account for possible structural changes of
the economy, the time-varying nature of monetary policy is better described, making the
analysis less susceptible to the Lucas critique as emphasized by Boivin (2006).
The ￿rst Greenbook forecasts were published in 1965. One shortcoming of the early
forecasts is that observations were not consistently available and forecasts for longer hori-
zons were not produced. Hence, for practical reasons our sample period covers the time
horizon from the ￿rst quarter of 1968 to the last quarter of 1999.13 Using the Greenbook
forecasts we estimate the structural relationship described by (1) for the pre-Volcker and
Volcker-Greenspan era. Our set of instruments is similar to the set of previously used
instruments and includes four lags of the growth rate of nonborrowed reserves, output-gap
and in￿ ation based on the GDP-de￿ ator.
In accordance with our previous ￿ndings, the growth rate of nonborrowed reserves
responds positively to rising in￿ ation forecasts in the pre-Volcker era and negatively in
the Volcker-Greenspan period, while the feedback from the real-time output-measure is
always negative (see Table 4). Overall, these estimates clearly point to the existence of a
shift in the conduct of U.S. monetary policy. Our ￿ndings contrast results which, by using
real-time data to estimate forward looking interest rate reaction functions, do not detect a
substantial shift in the structural part of U.S. post war monetary policy (see Orphanides,
2002).
Table 4. Estimation Results based on Greenbook Forecasts
Pre-Volcker Volcker-Greenspan

























R2 0:62 0:48 0:70 0:71
J 0:94 0:96 0:76 0:76
Notes: See notes to Table 1.
Real-time data seem to attribute a stronger role to the shorter in￿ ation forecast hori-
zon during the pre-Volcker era, while the longer forecast horizon becomes more impor-
12Moreover, Swanson (2004) assessing the Greenbook forecasts ￿nds that the Fed￿ s projections are largely
rational.
13Note that Greenbook forecasts are published with a ￿ve year lag.
13tant during the Volcker-Greenspan period. Our estimates further indicate that ex post
data overstate the (absolute value of the) in￿ ation elasticity. In fact, the real-time esti-
mates suggest that the Fed was less accommodating during the pre-Volcker era, while the
anti-in￿ ationary stance during the Volcker-Greenspan period was not as emphasized as
the ex post data based estimations suggest. As regards the feedback from the real-time
output-gap we discern two noteworthy results. First, monetary policy as described by our
money supply reaction function exhibits in both periods a stronger feedback from real-
time output-gap than from ex post output-gap. Second, during the pre-Volcker period
monetary policy was very activist in its response to the output-gap, while the emphasis on
the output-gap mitigated to some extent during the Volcker-Greenspan period. The latter
￿nding is in principle consistent with Orphanides (2004), though his results are based on
an interest rate reaction function. The di⁄erence in the estimated output-gap coe¢ cients
between real-time and ex post data might be due to the distorted estimation of the trend
component of output (see Orphanides, 2002, 2004): These misperceptions about the trend
component lead to a mismeasurement of the output-gap, which, if persistent over a pe-
riod of time, might result in biased output-gap coe¢ cients. As Orphanides (2004) points
out these misperceptions concerning potential output were only much later understood,
which may explain the striking di⁄erence in magnitude in the estimated coe¢ cient for the
real-time output-gap.
To summarize, the empirical analysis provides strong evidence for the supply of non-
borrowed reserves to react systematically to expected in￿ ation and the output-gap during
the past four decades of Federal Reserve policy. The empirical results further indicate that
monetary policy during the Volcker-Greenspan era had a proactive stance towards in￿ ation
stabilization. Our conclusion regarding the regime shift thus seems to be consistent with
the empirical results in Clarida et al. (2000) who characterize the Volcker-Greenspan era
as a highly reactive monetary policy regime. Conversely, in the pre-Volcker period, supply
of nominal balances appeared to be mildly accommodating, lending support to the view
that the Fed had a less anti-in￿ ationary stance though aimed to stabilize output during
that period. These main results are further robust to changes in the way expectations
are modelled, i.e., the results are qualitatively una⁄ected when we apply real-time data as
opposed to ex post data to describe the behavior of U.S. money supply.
3 Money supply and macroeconomic stability
In this section we apply a standard rational expectations model in order to assess the
implementation of optimal monetary policy and to assess macroeconomic stability, i.e.,
equilibrium determinacy, for the case where the central bank controls the supply of money
in a state contingent way. In the ￿rst part of this section we describe the model. In
the second part we disclose the properties of an e¢ cient money supply. In the third
part we derive the requirements for equilibrium determinacy under money supply reaction
14functions, which correspond to those used in Section 2.2.
3.1 A macroeconomic model
To facilitate comparisons with studies on macroeconomic stability under interest rate reac-
tion functions, we use a consensus macroeconomic model, i.e., the standard New Keynesian
model (see Clarida et al., 2000). This theoretical framework is based on a dynamic general
equilibrium model with optimizing households and ￿rms under rational expectations.
Our model is a linear approximation of a standard monetary sticky price model, which
is comprehensively described in the textbooks of Walsh (2005) and Woodford (2003). It is
a rational expectations equilibrium model with endogenous labor supply and an additively
separable CES utility function. The production of goods exhibits constant returns of scale
with labor as the single input. Goods prices are imperfectly ￿ exible, i.e., monopolistically
competitive ￿rms set prices in a staggered way (see Calvo, 1983). Money demand is
further induced by real balances entering the utility function. Uncertainty is due to cost-
push shocks ’t, which might, for example, originate in exogenous shifts in price or wage
mark-ups. Given that these types of shocks are distortionary, macroeconomic ￿ uctuations
lead to welfare losses.
Since the purpose of the paper is to assess monetary stabilization policy, we restrict
our attention to local equilibria that converge to a long-run equilibrium. Following large
parts of the literature, the equilibrium conditions are log-linearized at the steady state.
We further assume that the support of aggregate shocks is su¢ ciently small and that
the steady state gross nominal interest rate exceeds one, R > 1. In a neighborhood of
the steady state the equilibrium sequences are then approximated by the solutions to
the linearized equilibrium conditions, where b zt denotes the percent deviation of a generic
variable zt from its steady state value z, b zt = (zt ￿ z)=z.14
A rational expectations equilibrium consists of a set of sequences for in￿ ation b ￿t (where
￿t = Pt=Pt￿1), output b xt, (end-of-period) real balances b mt, and the nominal interest rate,
fb ￿t; b xt; b mt; b Rtg1
t=0 that converge to the steady state and satisfy
b ￿t =!b xt + ￿Etb ￿t+1 + b ’t; (4)
￿b xt =￿Etb xt+1 ￿ (b Rt ￿ Etb ￿t+1); (5)




]￿1 b Rt; (6)
with ￿ 2 (0;1), ￿ > 0, and ! > 0, and a monetary policy, for a given sequence of
shocks fb ’tg1
t=0 satisfying b ’t = ￿’b ’t￿1 + "t, where ￿’ 2 [0;1) and Et￿1"t = 0, and given
m￿1 = M￿1=P￿1 > 0, where M denotes nominal balances and P the aggregate price level.
14The derivation of these conditions can for example be found in Woodford (2005) or in Schabert (2005).
For simplicity we assume an identical elasticity of intertemporal substitution for consumption and real
balances, 1=￿.
15To disclose the main principles for the impact of money supply on macroeconomic
stability, we assume that the stock of monetary aggregates Mt that provides transactions
services in the goods market is tied to the stock of high-powered money Ht, for example, via
reserve requirements. In particular, we assume that the money multiplier does not change
endogenously, which we view as a reasonable approximation at business cycle frequencies.
Since we focus on the structural relations between money supply and macroeconomic
aggregates, we further disregard shocks to the multiplier, for convenience. In log-linearized
form the real values of both aggregates then simply satisfy b mt = b ht, where ht = Ht=Pt,
implying that the central bank is able to control the growth rate of nominal money b ￿t =
b mt ￿ b mt￿1 + b ￿t directly by adjusting the supply of high powered money (Ht=Ht￿1).
For the subsequent analysis, we consider the cases where money supply either responds
to the current in￿ ation rate (n = 0) or to the one-period ahead expected rate of in￿ ation
(n = 1), like in related studies on interest rate feedback rules. We assume that money
supply can be summarized by a forward-looking reaction function, according to which the
money growth rate ￿t is adjusted in response to changes in expected future in￿ ation, the
output-gap, and the exogenous state:
b ￿t = ￿￿Etb ￿t+n + ￿yb xt + ￿t, where n 2 f0;1g; (7)
where ￿t = ￿(b ’t) is a linear function of the cost-push shock￿ s current realization. The
type of reaction function in (7) for example accords to Evans and Honkapohja￿ s (2003 )
speci￿cation for forward-looking interest rate feedback rules, which can uniquely imple-
ment an optimal monetary policy. Since we do not model inertial instrument adjustments
explicitly, the feedback coe¢ cients ￿￿ and ￿y correspond to the "long-run" feedback co-
e¢ cients ￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) and ￿y=(1 ￿ ￿) in the empirical money supply speci￿cation (1). This
relationship will be used below to disclose whether the Federal Reserve￿ s money supply
has been associated with a unique or multiple rational expectations equilibria.
3.2 Implementing optimal policy with money supply adjustments
Before we turn to the main part of the theoretical analysis, namely, the assessment of
macroeconomic stability under forward-looking money supply reaction functions (7), we
characterize e¢ cient money supply. For this, we adopt Woodford￿ s (2003) second-order
approximation of household welfare at the steady state. Since we are interested in mon-
etary stabilization policy, we abstract from long-run distortions and we assume that an
unspeci￿ed lump-sum ￿nanced subsidy eliminates average distortions due to monopolistic
competition. Output deviations from the steady state then represent output-gaps, since
any deviation of current output from its steady state value is induced by a distortionary
shock b ’t. We further assume that the distortions due to transactions frictions are negli-
gible, such that a second-order Taylor-expansion of household welfare and of the private
sector equilibrium conditions at the undistorted steady state leads to the following central















where ￿ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erentiated intermediate
goods. The optimal plan of the central bank acting under commitment in a timeless
perspective is then known to be characterized by (4)-(6) and the central bank￿ s ￿rst order
condition b xt ￿ b xt￿1 = ￿￿b ￿t 8t ￿ 0 (see Clarida et al., 1999 or Woodford, 2003). This
plan can in principle be implemented in di⁄erent ways, e.g. by an interest rate reaction
function or by a state contingent money supply. It can be shown that a forward looking
money supply reaction function can implement the optimal plan.
Proposition 1 The central bank can implement its optimal commitment plan under a






(￿ ￿ 1)￿ + ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
! < 0;
and ￿t = ￿￿￿ (b xt ￿ Et￿1b xt) ￿ ￿ (b ￿t ￿ Et￿1b ￿t) ￿ [(￿ ￿ 1) + ￿ (￿￿ ￿ 1)]b ’t. Under rational




￿!+￿(1￿￿1)+(1￿￿￿’), where ￿1 =
1
2￿f￿ ￿ ￿[(￿=￿)2 ￿ 4￿￿1]1=2g 2 (0;1) and ￿ = 1 + ￿ + ￿!.
Proof. See appendix 5.2.
According to proposition 1, a forward-looking money supply reaction function (7) can be
consistent with the central bank￿ s optimal commitment plan under a timeless perspec-
tive. The feedback coe¢ cients of the particular reaction function characterized in the
proposition demand that nominal balances respond by less than one for one with expected
in￿ ation, ￿￿ < 1, and decrease with the output-gap, ￿y < 0. It should be noted that this
reaction function does not feature a lagged indicator (e.g. lagged output-gap), which is
necessary for an interest rate reaction function to be able to implement the commitment
solution (see Clarida et al., 1999, or Woodford, 2003). The reason is that the instrument
on the left hand side of (7) already contains a backward-looking element (b mt￿1), which is
su¢ cient to implement history dependent equilibrium sequences (see Schabert, 2005).
A closer look at the coe¢ cient ￿￿ = ￿￿1
￿ ￿ further shows that the in￿ ation feedback can
either be positive or negative, depending on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption. If households are very risk-averse and highly prefer a smooth consumption
paths (large ￿), the central bank￿ s trade-o⁄ between the stabilization of in￿ ation and
output shift towards the latter. As a consequence, the in￿ ation feedback is positive.
17Otherwise, if households care less about consumption smoothing (￿ < 1), the in￿ ation
feedback is negative. In any case, the central bank should supply money in a way that
ensures real balances to decrease with in￿ ation (￿￿ < 1). However, a positive or a negative
sign of the in￿ ation feedback can be consistent with an optimal money supply, depending
on the households￿degree of risk aversion. Since our estimates for the output-gap feedback
are always negative (see Section 2) and there is no clear consensus on the value for ￿, money
supply under both Federal Reserve regimes was in principle consistent with optimal policy.
3.3 Money supply and equilibrium determinacy
Next we want to examine the equilibrium determinacy properties of the model under
forward-looking money supply reaction functions (7) with unrestricted feedback coe¢ -
cients ￿￿ and ￿y. The model (4)-(7) exhibits one backward-looking element, i.e., the
predetermined state variable b mt￿1. Equilibrium uniqueness therefore requires that there
exists exactly one stable eigenvalue. It can be shown that the existence of exactly one
stable and positive eigenvalue requires a money supply reaction function (7) for n = 1 and





which in terms of the feedback coe¢ cients in the presence of partial adjustments reads ￿￿+
￿y
1￿￿
! < 1 ￿ ￿ (see Section 2). Condition (8) demands the weighted sum of the feedback
coe¢ cients in (7) to be smaller than one.15 This condition evidently corresponds to the
well known Taylor-principle which requires the weighted sum of the long-run coe¢ cients
of an interest rate feedback rule to be larger than one (see Woodford, 2001).
To get an intuition for this "inverted" Taylor-principle consider the case ￿y = 0. If the
economy is hit by a cost push shock b ’t > 0, in￿ ation tends to rise, leading to a decreasing
real value of money for ￿￿ < 1. In this case, the output-gap will be narrowed (see 6), which
stabilizes in￿ ation by (4). Otherwise, ￿￿ > 1, money supply is accommodative such that
real balances grow. This tends to reduce the interest rate and to raise aggregate demand,
such that price pressure further increases. Due to this mechanism money supply policy
can render multiple equilibria or instability (i.e. non-existence of convergent equilibrium
sequences) possible. It should, however, be noted that condition (8) just ensures that
there exists exactly one positive stable eigenvalue, leading to a non-oscillatory equilibrium
solution. Hence, there might also exist alternative equilibrium solutions (characterized
by one positive and one negative stable eigenvalue). The following proposition presents
determinacy conditions for current looking (n = 0) and forward looking (n = 1) money
supply reaction functions (7).16
15A similar condition is shown in Schabert (2006) to be necessary and su¢ cient for determinacy in a
continuous time sticky price model.
16The unique equilibrium solution is in both cases non-oscillatory. The determinacy conditions for case
18Proposition 2 Suppose that the central bank adjusts the supply of money according to (7).
Then, the equilibrium exhibits determinacy if and only if (8) and either ￿￿+￿y
1+￿
! < 1+￿
for n = 0 or ￿￿￿+￿y
1+￿
! < 1+￿ for n = 1, where ￿ = 2(￿! + (2￿￿ + 1)(1 + ￿))=! > 0





Proof. See appendix 5.3.
Given the conditions in proposition 2 we can now easily check the determinacy implications
of the Fed￿ s money supply. For this we set the feedback coe¢ cients in (7) equal to the point
estimates in Section 2.2, ￿￿ = b ￿￿=(1 ￿ b ￿) and ￿y = b ￿y=(1 ￿ b ￿). Since the feedback from
output-gap and in￿ ation has been negative in the Volcker-Greenspan period, condition (8)
is evidently satis￿ed. The additional conditions given in proposition 2 are further satis￿ed
for n = 0 and for any reasonable set of parameter values also for n = 1.17 Thus, our
analysis unambiguously implies that money supply in the Volcker-Greenspan period has
been associated with equilibrium uniqueness.
To assess the determinacy implications of the pre-Volcker policy, we have to take a
closer look at the point estimates presented in Table 2-4. Since the output-gap feedback
is always negative, condition (8) can be violated only if the long-run in￿ ation feedback
b ￿￿=(1￿b ￿) exceeds one. Computing these values for all speci￿cations in Section 2 however
shows that b ￿￿=(1 ￿ b ￿) is always strictly smaller than one. For example, its maximum
value is 0:86 for ex post data (see table 2) and 0:27 for real time data (see table 4). Hence,
condition (8) cannot be violated. Moreover, the additional conditions given in proposition
2 are always satis￿ed.
Corollary 3 If the feedback coe¢ cients ￿￿ and ￿y for the money supply reaction function
(7) equal the long-run feedback coe¢ cients estimated for the Pre-Volcker period, ￿￿ =
b ￿￿=(1 ￿ b ￿) and ￿y = b ￿y=(1 ￿ b ￿), the equilibrium never exhibits indeterminacy.
Thus, we can summarize that a money supply that is characterized by feedback coe¢ cients
that are equal to the point estimates obtained for the pre-Volcker period, the rational
expectations equilibrium is uniquely determined. This result holds regardless of the sample
period and whether we use the estimates for revised data or for real-time data. Thus
our analysis of the stability implications of money supply regimes leads to a di⁄erent
conclusion than previous studies focussing on interest rate rules: Pre-Volcker Federal
Reserve policy has not been associated with multiple equilibria and therefore did not
allow for macroeconomic ￿ uctuations induced by non-fundamental shocks.
The di⁄erence between the determinacy results for money growth and interest rate pol-
icy corresponds to the property of nominal (in)determinacy under money growth (interest
n = 0 have already been derived in Schabert (2005).





, regardless whether the degree of price rigidities is calibrated to match micro or macro
evidence (see Bils and Klenow, 2004, Gali and Gertler, 1999).
19rate) policy, which has been stressed by Sargent and Wallace (1975).18 While a con-
stant money growth policy facilitates nominal determinacy under perfectly ￿ exible prices,
it causes beginning-of-period real balances to be relevant for equilibrium determination
when prices are not perfectly ￿ exible. The predetermined value of real money then serves
as a equilibrium selection criterion, which rules out additional solutions that might allow
for endogenous ￿ uctuations. As shown by Black (1974), the determinacy implications
under money growth policy can change if the central bank adjusts money with in￿ ation.
In particular, he shows that price level indeterminacy prevails if real balances grow with
in￿ ation (￿￿ > 1). Thus, determinacy is not guaranteed by any money supply policy, but
requires real balances to decrease with in￿ ation. According to our results, Federal Reserve
policy always satis￿ed this requirement and thereby never allowed for macroeconomic
instability.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we provide empirical evidence that the Federal Reserve￿ s money supply, i.e.,
the supply of nonborrowed reserves, has responded to changes in expected in￿ ation and
the output-gap. Estimates of forward-looking money supply reaction functions for the pre-
1979 (pre-Volcker) and the post-1979 (Volcker-Greenspan) period reveal that money supply
responded negatively to a widening output-gap in both periods. In contrast, money supply
responses to changes in expected in￿ ation exhibit considerable di⁄erences between both
regimes. The Volcker-Greenspan regime was characterized by a highly anti-in￿ ationary
policy indicated by a signi￿cantly negative feedback from expected in￿ ation. Conversely,
we ￿nd a positive feedback from expected in￿ ation for the pre-Volcker regime, indicating a
less anti-in￿ ationary policy stance. These ￿ndings thus con￿rm related evidence based on
the analysis of the federal funds rate, namely that the Federal Reserve policy in the pre-
Volcker era was conducted in a less in￿ ation stabilizing way than in the Volcker-Greenspan
era. Moreover, our ￿ndings are supported when the analysis is conducted with real-time
data.
We further provide a theoretical analysis of the stabilization properties of forward-
looking money supply reaction functions in a standard sticky price model. The key re-
quirement is that money supply has to be associated with real balances that decrease with
in￿ ation in order to ensure macroeconomic stability. Applying the results from the empir-
ical analysis, money supply regimes characterized by the estimated feedback coe¢ cients
are shown to lead to a uniquely determined rational expectations equilibrium. According
to this result, we cannot con￿rm the hypothesis of Clarida et al. (2000) that the pre-
Volcker policy has contributed to high and volatile in￿ ation rates in the 1970￿ s by failing
to pin down the rational expectations equilibrium. Viewed through a money supply lens
18See also Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001, 2003) and Schabert (2006) for di⁄erent determinacy implications
of money growth and interest rate rules.
20Federal Reserve policy in the pre-1979 period has been su¢ ciently reactive to guarantee
equilibrium determinacy and to rule out expectations driven (endogenous) ￿ uctuations.
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5.1 Estimates for alternative output-gap measures
Table A1. Estimation Results Based on Unemployment
Pre-Volcker Volcker-Greenspan

























R2 0:54 0:53 0:73 0:73
J 0:57 0:59 0:92 0:91
Notes: Estimations are conducted using the alternative
output gap measure based on the deviation of unemplyoment
rate from a ￿tted quadratic function of time. See notes to
Table 1.
Table A2. Estimation Results based on Detrended Output
Pre-Volcker Volcker-Greenspan

























R2 0:52 0:51 0:72 0:72
J 0:42 0:41 0:92 0:95
Notes: Estimations are conducted using the alternative
output gap measure based on the deviation of (log) GDP
from a ￿tted quadratic function of time. See notes to Table
1.
225.2 Proof of proposition 1
In order to establish the claim made in the proposition, we derive feedback coe¢ cients
for a money supply reaction function of the type (7) that is consistent with the central
bank￿ s commitment plan under a timeless perspective. The plan is a set of sequences
fb xt;b ￿tg1
t=0 satisfying (4)-(6), and b xt ￿ b xt￿1 = ￿￿b ￿t 8t ￿ 0. Eliminating the interest rate




]￿1, in (5) leads
to b mt = (1 + ￿￿) b xt ￿ ￿￿Etb xt+1 ￿ ￿Etb ￿t+1, which for t ￿ 1 reads b mt￿1 = (1 + ￿￿) b xt￿1 ￿
￿￿Et￿1b xt ￿ ￿Et￿1b ￿t. Combining these conditions shows that private sector behavior
implies the following equilibrium behavior for the money growth rate, b ￿t = b mt+b ￿t￿ b mt￿1:
b ￿t = b ￿t + (1 + ￿￿)(b xt ￿ b xt￿1) ￿ ￿￿ (Etb xt+1 ￿ Et￿1b xt) ￿ ￿ (Etb ￿t+1 ￿ Et￿1b ￿t):
Using the central bank￿ s ￿rst order condition for t, b xt￿b xt￿1 = ￿￿b ￿t, as well as for t+1 and
taking expectations, Etb xt+1 = ￿￿Etb ￿t+1 + b xt, one can rewrite the equilibrium condition
for the money growth rate as
b ￿t = ￿[(￿ ￿ 1) + ￿ (￿￿ ￿ 1)]b ￿t + ￿ (￿￿ ￿ 1)Etb ￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿ (b xt ￿ Et￿1b xt) ￿ ￿ (b ￿t ￿ Et￿1b ￿t):
Further, eliminating the current in￿ ation rate with (4) one obtains the equilibrium money






(￿ ￿ 1)￿ + ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
!b xt + ￿t





￿￿￿1 = ￿=[￿ (1 ￿ ￿)] holds at an undistorted steady
state. Note that ￿t contains expectation errors and is a function of the exogenous state
only and is given by ￿(b ’t) = ￿￿￿ (b xt ￿ Et￿1b xt)￿￿ (b ￿t ￿ Et￿1b ￿t)￿[(￿ ￿ 1)+￿ (￿￿ ￿ 1)]b ’t.
In order to identify the reduced for of ￿t under rational expectations, we further derive
the solution for the output-gap and in￿ ation sequences under the central bank￿ s plan, i.e.,
for a set fb xt;b ￿tg satisfying b xt ￿ b xt￿1 = ￿￿b ￿t and b ￿t = !b xt + ￿Etb ￿t+1 + b ’t. Since there
exists one backward-looking element, b xt￿1, the fundamental solution for the output-gap
and in￿ ation takes the general form
b xt = ￿1b xt￿1 + ￿2b ’t and b ￿t = ￿3b xt￿1 + ￿4b ’t:
Applying the method of undetermined coe¢ cients, one gets the following expressions for
￿2, ￿3, and ￿4 (as a function of the eigenvalue ￿1)
￿2 =￿￿￿4 < 0, ￿3 = (1 ￿ ￿1)=￿ > 0,
￿4 =
1








￿4￿￿1 + ￿2, where
￿ =
1+￿+￿!
￿ > 1=￿. It can easily be shown that one solution exceeds one, while the other
lies between zero and one. Hence, the single feasible solution for ￿1 that is associated with
















where ￿1 2 (0;1). Thus, the fundamental solution is the unique solution to the central
bank￿ s plan. Using the fundamental solution to write the forecast errors as b xt ￿Et￿1b xt =
￿2b ’t and b ￿t ￿ Et￿1b ￿t = ￿4b ’t, we can ￿nally write ￿t = ￿(b ’t) solely as a function of the
exogenous state
￿(b ’t) = ￿b ’t, where ￿ = ￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿
￿ (￿￿ ￿ 1)




+ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)




Hence, the central bank￿ s plan is consistent with a forward-looking money supply re-
action function satisfying b ￿t = ￿￿Etb ￿t+1 + ￿yb xt + ￿b ’t, where ￿￿ = ￿￿1
￿ ￿ < 1 and
￿y = ￿
(￿￿1)￿+￿(￿￿1)
(1￿￿)￿ ! < 0. ￿
5.3 Proof of proposition 2
To proof the ￿rst part of the proposition, the deterministic version of the model with a









































]￿1 > 0. The characteristic polynomial of A, which is given by
Kn=1(X)=X3 ￿ X2￿ + ￿￿ + ￿! + 2￿￿￿ + !￿￿ ￿ ￿￿y
￿￿￿
￿X






takes the following values at 0, 1 and ￿1
Kn=1(0)=￿(￿￿ + 1)=(￿￿￿) < ￿1;
Kn=1(1)=￿￿1￿￿1￿￿1 ￿




￿y (1 + ￿) ￿ !￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ 2(￿! + (2￿￿ + 1)(1 + ￿))
￿
:
Since Kn=1(0) = ￿det(A) = ￿(￿￿ + 1)=(￿￿￿) < ￿1, there exists at least one unstable
positive root, while there is exactly one stable positive root if (8) is satis￿ed, such that
24Kn=1(1) > 0. Thus, there is exactly one stable root (indicating determinacy) if (8) and





2(￿! + (2￿￿ + 1)(1 + ￿))
!
:
To establish the second part of the proposition (n = 0), we use that the characteristic
polynomial of the changed matrix A is
Kn=0(X)=X3 ￿ X2￿ + ￿￿ + ￿! + 2￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿y
￿￿￿
￿X






Since Kn=0(0) = Kn=1(0) < ￿1, there exists at least one unstable positive root, while there
is exactly one stable positive root if (8) is satis￿ed, such that Kn=0(1) = Kn=0(1) > 0.
Thus, there is exactly one stable root (indicating stability and uniqueness) if (8) and





2((1 + 2￿￿)(1 + ￿) + ￿!)
!
:
which is ensured by (8) if ￿y < 0. This completes the proof. ￿
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